43. The information indicates that Iran has carried out the following activities that are relevant to the
development of a nuclear explosive device:
• Efforts, some successful, to procure nuclear related and dual use equipment and materials by
military related individuals and entities (Annex, Sections C.1 and C.2);
• Efforts to develop undeclared pathways for the production of nuclear material (Annex,
Section C.3);
• The acquisition of nuclear weapons development information and documentation from a
clandestine nuclear supply network (Annex, Section C.4); and
• Work on the development of an indigenous design of a nuclear weapon including the testing of
components (Annex, Sections C.5–C.12).

C.10. Conducting a test
58. The Agency has information provided by a Member State that Iran may have planned and
undertaken preparatory experimentation which would be useful were Iran to carry out a test of a nuclear
explosive device. In particular, the Agency has information that Iran has conducted a number of practical
tests to see whether its EBW firing equipment would function satisfactorily over long distances between a
firing point and a test device located down a deep shaft. Additionally, among the alleged studies
documentation provided by that Member State, is a document, in Farsi, which relates directly to the
logistics and safety arrangements that would be necessary for conducting a nuclear test. The Agency has
been informed by a different Member State that these arrangements directly reflect those which have been
used in nuclear tests conducted by nuclear-weapon States.
C.11. Integration into a missile delivery vehicle
59. The alleged studies documentation contains extensive information regarding work which is alleged
to have been conducted by Iran during the period 2002 to 2003 under what was known as Project 111.
From that information, the project appears to have consisted of a structured and comprehensive
programme of engineering studies to examine how to integrate a new spherical payload into the existing
payload chamber which would be mounted in the re-entry vehicle of the Shahab 3 missile.

According to that documentation, using a number of commercially available computer codes, Iran
conducted computer modelling studies of at least 14 progressive design iterations of the payload chamber
and its contents to examine how they would stand up to the various stresses that would be encountered on
being launched and travelling on a ballistic trajectory to a target. It should be noted that the masses and
dimensions of components identified in information provided to the Agency by Member States that Iran is
alleged to have been developing (see paragraphs 43 and 48 above) correspond to those assessed to have
been used in Project 111 engineering studies on the new payload chamber.